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A central claim in favor of decentralization is that it will improve access to public services, 
but few studies examine this question empirically.  This paper explores the effects of 
decentralization on access to health and education in Colombia.  We benefit from an 
original database that includes over 95% of Colombian municipalities.  Our results show 
that decentralization improved enrollment rates in public schools and access of the poor to 
public health services.  In both sectors, improving access was driven by the financial 
contributions of  local governments.  Our theoretical findings imply that local governments 
with better information about local preferences will concentrate their resources in the areas 
their voters care about most.  The combination of empirical and theoretical results implies 
that decentralization provides local officials with the information and incentives they need 
to allocate resources in a manner responsive to voters’ needs, and improve the quality of 
expenditures so as to maximize their impact.  The end result is greater usage of local 
services by citizens. 
Keywords:  decentralization, education, health, public investment, Colombia, local 
government. 
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Resumen 
Un argumento central a favor de la descentralización es que mejora el acceso a los servicios 
públicos y sociales. No obstante, pocos estudios examinan esta cuestión de manera 
empírica. Este documento explora los efectos de la descentralización sobre el acceso a la 
salud y educación utilizando información de una base de datos que incluye más del 95% de 
las municipalidades colombianas.  Los resultados muestran que la descentralización mejoró 
las tasas de cobertura escolar y el acceso de los pobres los servicios públicos de salud. En 
ambos sectores la mejoría en el acceso estuvo impulsada por la contribución financiera de 
los gobiernos locales. El modelo teórico muestra que los gobiernos locales con mejor 
información  sobre las preferencias locales concentrará sus recursos propios en las áreas en 
las que los votantes están más interesados y les dan mayor importancia. La combinación de 
resultados empíricos y teóricos implica que la descentralización provee a los funcionarios 
locales la información y los incentivos que necesitan para asignar los recursos de forma que 
responda más a las necesidades de los votantes. Así se mejora la calidad del gasto y se 
maximiza su impacto. El resultado final es una mayor utilización de los servicios locales 
por parte de los ciudadanos.  
 
Palabras clave: descentralización, educación, salud, inversión pública, Colombia, 
gobierno local. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Across both the developing and developed worlds, policy reformers are experimenting with 
a wide array of federalist tools and incentives, ranging from administrative deconcentration 
to the full-scale devolution of power and resources to subnational levels of government 
(Manor 1999, World Bank 2004).  Their efforts are based on theoretical arguments about 
decentralization’s potential to improve the efficiency of public services and make 
government more accountable to the governed.  Of these arguments, perhaps the most 
important – and common – is that decentralization will improve the quality of public sector 
outcomes by “bringing government closer to the people”.  This somewhat vague phrase can 
be unpacked into three effects that decentralization is meant to have that are conceptually 
separable, albeit interrelated.  Decentralization… 
 
(i)  places more and/or better information in the hands of public officials; 
(ii)  increases the voice and participation of citizens in the government process; and 
(iii)  improves the accountability, and hence responsiveness, of public servants to 
citizens. 
 
All of these effects, it is claimed, come about as a result of the creation of 
functionally independent local governments that are physically closer to their electorates 
(than central government), and whose political fortunes are in the hands of those who 
benefit – or suffer – from the local services they provide.  If “bringing government closer to 
the people” leads to improved information, voice and participation, and accountability in 
public decision-making, then local public services should improve as a result.  Services can 
improve in two broad ways: (a) lower costs via higher productive efficiency and less 
corruption; and (b) higher quality, interpreted to include services better-suited to local 
needs and conditions.  Improved services, in turn, should lead to more intensive use by 
local citizens, and thence to better substantive outcomes.  Examples of better substantive 
outcomes might include higher test scores in education, and lower mortality rates in health. 
Oddly, very few studies attempt to test this argument directly.  This is odder still 
when one considers the vast size of the decentralization literature, and the frequency with 
which it invokes the argument.  Only three studies that we know of address the link  4
between decentralization and substantive outcomes directly and with rigorous quantitative 
evidence.  Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2008) investigate evidence from a natural 
experiment in Argentina, and find that decentralization of school control from central to 
provincial governments had a positive impact on student test scores.  The poorest, however, 
did not gain, and indeed may have lost.  Habibi et al. (2007), also studying Argentina, find 
that increasing devolution to the provinces led to sustained improvements in human 
development.  Infant mortality fell and educational retention rates (from primary to 
secondary school) rose as decentralization deepened.  And Barankay and Lockwood (2007) 
find that greater decentralization of education to Swiss cantons is associated with higher 
educational attainment, allowing Swiss boys to close the gender gap with girls. 
Other recent empirical studies ask the related question of whether decentralization 
improves local information or abets elite capture.  Galasso & Ravallion (2005) use 
household and community level data to study results from the Food-for-Education (FFE) 
program in Bangladesh.  They find that information on individual productivity differences 
is reasonably common knowledge within villages.  FFE proves to be mildly pro-poor – per 
capita allocations are higher for the poor than the non-poor, and it is the intra-village 
component that has largest effect.  Bardhan & Mookherjee (2006) test for elite capture in 
89 villages in West Bengal.  They find little evidence of elite capture in the allocation of 
private goods.  Public goods projects, however, do exhibit capture.  They theorize that this 
is because public goods are inherently less transparent – it is less clear than for private 
goods who gets how much.  Alderman (2000) finds that local government poverty targeting 
exceeds that which could be expected based on proxy indicators alone.  Local governments 
appear to be using information not available to outsiders.  And lastly, Loboguerrero (2008) 
finds that the effects of decentralization on local economic growth in Colombia depend on 
the governance structure of municipalities.  Where local authorities have better information 
on local needs, resources will be allocated in the sectors with the highest rate of return, 
promoting growth.  Where bad governance prevails, resources will flow to less efficient 
sectors, facilitating corruption, waste, and ultimately leading to lower growth. 
This paper adds to the evidence on decentralization’s effects on public sector 
outcomes by examining access to primary services in Colombia.  We use an original 
database to investigate decentralization’s effects on public school enrollments and public 
health insurance coverage of the poor.  To our knowledge, this is the first paper to address  5
these questions with a rigorous quantitative approach.  We find this curious given that the 
first three studies mentioned above go further, investigating decentralization’s effects on 
substantive outcomes (e.g. test scores, infant mortality), as opposed to public service 
outcomes (e.g. school enrollment, insurance coverage).  Indeed, ideally we too would have 
focused on substantive outcomes.  But as for most countries, data limitations do not yet 
allow this for Colombia.  So we focus instead on the closest outcome indicators available, 
on the assumption that higher enrollments and expanded access to health care will lead to 
better substantive educational and health outcomes for citizens. 
Colombia is an interesting case worthy of study for three reasons.  First, unlike 
many countries that have passed decentralization laws, Colombia implemented a significant 
reform vigorously, with large, measurable effects on public finances and domestic politics.  
We provide evidence of the former below.  Second, the quantity and quality of subnational 
data available for Colombia are particularly high, and demand to be exploited.  Thirdly and 
more subtly, it is our view that much – perhaps most – of the huge decentralization 
literature is plagued by an excess of cross-country comparison, and a lack of 
methodological and quantitative rigor.  Too much of the empirical literature is based upon: 
(a) large-N cross-country studies, which suffer from problems of data comparability and 
multiple institutional, historical, and other external factors that are not properly controlled, 
or (b) small-N studies of decentralization in one or a few countries, based on evidence that 
is limited, anecdotal, and rarely goes beyond descriptive statistics.  Like the papers cited 
above, our study avoids these methodological pitfalls by conducting a large-N study on a 
single country, Colombia.  This allows us to focus in depth on the process and institutional 
context of reform, and probe its effects with a large amount of high-quality data.  By 
studying decentralization in this way, we can combine the formal rigor and generality of 
large-N approaches with the detailed knowledge and analytical nuance of small-N studies, 
while avoiding variation in the deep structural factors that bedevil cross-country work in 
this field. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the Colombian 
decentralization program, focusing on its legal and budgetary aspects, and provides 
descriptive statistics for public investment flows and access to education and health 
services during the period immediately following decentralization.  Section 3 models the 
joint provision of local public goods as a Stackelberg follower game in which political  6
competition provides local governments with better information on local preferences, but 
central government is more productive.  Section 4 presents our quantitative methodology.  
Section 5 examines whether decentralization increased school enrollment and access to 
health care in Colombia with detailed econometric evidence.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Decentralization in Colombia 
2.1  The Decentralization Program 
 
Unlike countries where decentralization was implemented very quickly and with limited 
public debate, such as Bolivia (Faguet 2004), the Colombian decentralization process took 
some twenty-five years.  Until the early 1990s, progress was slow and often stalled, as 
debates waxed and waned about loosening the reigns of control of a highly centralized 
administrative apparatus inherited from the Spanish crown.  Colombia’s mayors and 
governors were then directly named by central government; governors in particular were 
the President’s hombres de confianza, and carried out his will in the regions.  But over time 
the proponents of reform grew in strength, reform deepened, moving from the fiscal and 
bureaucratic to the political, and culminating in the constitutional reform of 1991.  Ceballos 
and Hoyos (2004) identify three broad phases of decentralization: 
Phase 1 began in the late 1970s, and included a number of fiscal measures aimed at 
strengthening municipal finances.  Laws 14 of 1983 and 12 of 1986 were most important, 
assigning increased powers of tax collection to municipalities, including especially sales 
tax, and establishing parameters for the investment of these funds.  Locally raised 
municipal “own resources”, the use of which is unfettered by regional or central 
governments, grew dramatically as a result (see figure 1). 
 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, phase 2 was more concerned with political and 
administrative matters.  Amongst the most important of these measures was Law 11 of 
1986, which regulated the popular election of mayors and sought to promote popular 
participation in local public decision-making via Juntas Administradoras Locales, amongst 
others.  Reforms enshrined in the 1991 constitution, such as citizens’ initiatives, municipal 
planning councils, open town meetings, the ability to revoke mayoral mandates, referenda,  7
and popular consultations, deepened political decentralization further.  The 1991 
constitution also established the popular election of governors. 
 
Phase 3 consisted of a number of laws that regulated the new constitution, and other 
related fiscal and administrative reforms.  These measures assigned greater responsibility to 
municipalities for the provision of public services and social investment, and provided 
additional resources for the same by increasing central government transfers to local 
governments significantly.  The laws leave local governments little discretion over 
transferred funds, mandating that the bulk should be spent on education and health.   
Automatic transfers to sub-national governments rose from about 20% to over 40% of total 
government spending, placing Colombia first in the region amongst countries with a unitary 
state, and third overall behind the two big federal countries, Brazil and Argentina (Alesina 
et al., 2000). 
 
2.2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Detailed municipal-level expenditure and investment data are available for Colombia from 
1993 onwards.  While reliable data on municipal revenues and transfers are available up to 
2007, the most recent good data on expenditures and outcomes varies between 2003-07, 
depending on sector.  The lack of older data means that we cannot compare decentralized 
investment priorities to a relatively “pure” centralized regime (pre-1980s).  The characteristics 
of Colombia’s reform process, marked by gradualism and long-term change, make this less of 
a problem.  As discussed above, a number of key decentralizing mechanisms, such as citizens’ 
initiatives, referenda, mayoral recall, and increased resource transfers, were only put in place 
with the 1991 constitutional reform and accompanying regulations.  These transferred 
resources and authority to municipalities gradually over time.  Hence the outlines of 
Colombia’s decentralization “package” became fully clear only in 1992-93, setting off a 
process that deepened thereafter.  Indeed, the empirical measures of decentralization that we 
use below all show monotonically increasing levels of decentralization throughout the period.  
Hence hereafter we treat the beginning of the period (1993-94) as years with relatively high 
centralization, and the end of the period (2004-07) as years with relatively high 
decentralization.  8
The aggregate effect of a quarter-century of political and fiscal reforms was a large increase 
in the political authority and operational independence of Colombia’s municipal 
governments, accompanied by a huge rise in the resources they controlled.  Municipalities 
were allowed to raise significant taxes and issue public debt, and could spend these 
resources as they chose.  This point is important to our identification strategy, below.  The 
latter gave local authorities a strong incentive to increase local tax receipts, which they did 
with much success as figure 1 shows.  Central-to-local government transfers also increased 
strongly – by 139% over the same period.  Overall municipal expenditures and investments 
rose from 2.7% to 7.6% of GDP over a decade, as detailed in figure 2.  This huge rise was 
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Source: National Planning Department; original calculations. 
Figure 1: Municipal Tax Receipts (constant 2007 pesos) 
 
                                                 
3 Colombia’s public accounts classify such items as teachers’ and health workers’ salaries as 
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    Source: National Planning Department; original calculations. 
Figure 2: Municipal Expenditure and Investment (%GDP) 
 
How were these resources invested?  In order to compare like with like, figure 3 provides a 
sectoral breakdown of central government investment in 1994 alongside local government 
investment of own resources in 2003.  The differences are large.  Central government’s 
largest category, at 38% of the total, is infrastructure, whereas local government’s largest is 
health, followed by education, which together comprise 81% of the local investment 
budget.  The broader pattern of dark and light bars shows a clear shift in public sector 
priorities, and resources, away from infrastructure and industry and commerce, into health, 
education, and water and sanitation. 


















        Source: National Planning Department; original calculations. 
Figure 3: Central vs. Local Government Investment  10
Lastly, is there any descriptive evidence of changes in education and health 
outcomes?  We focus on school attendance and access to the public health system.  Figure 4 
shows enrollment data over the decade for public and private schools, with enrollment in 
1994 indexed to 1.  At the outset, public and private enrollment trends are quite similar.  
After 1996 an increasing gap opens up between them, although they follow similar up and 
down trends.  After 1999, however, slopes diverge, leading to a large gap between the two 
educational systems.  Decentralization coincides with a 20 percent increase in total school 
enrollment, unequally distributed: public school enrollment increased 30 percent, while 
private school enrollment fell seven percent.  This suggests that local governments may 
have been able to run schools and promote attendance better than central government had 
before. 





























 Source: National Planning Department; original calculations. 
Figure 4: Decentralization and School Enrollment 
 
Figure 5 shows the proportion of poor Colombians enrolled in the country’s public 
health insurance scheme.  The regimen subsidiado de salud is the means by which the state 
provides subsidized insurance covering primary and emergency health care for the poor.  
“Access” in this case is not a vague concept as it is in some surveys – e.g. population living 
within a health facility’s catchment area – but, instead, has a quite specific meaning: 
individuals actively enrolled in the regimen, with name, address, and other details 
registered with the Ministry of Health.  It is reasonable to assume that such individuals are  11
aware of the public health system, and of their eligibility to receive benefits from it.  Hence 
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    Source: National Planning Department; original calculations. 
Figure 5: Health Insurance Coverage Rate by Regions 
 
Figure 5 shows that access to health care rose dramatically throughout Colombia.  In the 
Andean region the proportion of poor people covered by the regimen subsidiado rose from 
27% to almost 90%.  The worst-performing region initially – the Caribbean – saw an even 
more dramatic gain, with access rising from about 11% of the poor to just over 70%.  The 
period of deepening decentralization in Colombia thus coincided with a dramatic 
improvement in the access of the poor to health care, with increases of between 200% and 
550%.  Was decentralization responsible for these improvements?  Descriptive statistics 
such as these are only suggestive.  We return to this question with much more rigor below. 
 
3.  A Simple Model of Public Goods Provision 
As in many countries, Colombia’s local education and health services are jointly provided 
by central and local governments.  The evidence in section 5 below thus focuses on the 
effects that greater local control of the finance and administration of primary services has 
on service uptake by local citizens.  But before delving into the empirics of the question, it  12
is useful to formalize the underlying relationship in which center and periphery are 
involved.  To better understand how interactions between them affect provision of a 
common local public good, this section develops a simple model of joint provision, 
following Varian (1994) and Batina and Ihori (2005), in which central government moves 
first, and local government is a Stackelberg follower in a dynamic game with full 
information. 
The key tradeoff is that local governments have better information, but central 
government is more efficient in the production of public goods.  The former is due to local 
political competition, which we can think of as election cycles and the lobbying, 
campaigning and related dynamics that these entail, which provide local governments with 
information about local preferences.  Political competition does not, by contrast, provide 
central government with useful information about local preferences.  This is because 
national elections do not focus on local issues and specific local policy options in the way 
that local elections do.  The latter half of the tradeoff may be thought of as traditional 
economies of scale, or as technological or organizational advantages over local 
governments in the production of public goods.  In many countries, for example, the most 
capable public sector professionals work for central, not local, government.  This allows 
central agencies to design, plan, and implement interventions that are higher quality, more 
cost effective, or both. 
Assume a country made up of T districts, each with population nj where j denotes 
district.  Individuals have linear utility Ui = ln(xi) + θiln(gj) where xi is the amount of 
private good consumed by individual i, gj is the amount of public good available in district 
j, and θi is individual i’s preference for public good gj.  Central and local governments’ 
contributions to the common public good are denoted gj
c and gj
l, hence gj = gj
c + gj
l.  We 
denote the local median preference for the public good in district j as θmj.  Local welfare is 
defined as median utility, Umj = ln(xmj) + θmjln(gj). 
The function of government is to provide public goods, which it finances with a 
local head tax.  Local government ascertains θmj with probability pl and θ-mj with 
probability (1 – pl), and central government ascertains θmj with probability pc and θ-mj with 
probability (1 – pc).  Probability varies as pl,c∈[0,1], and θ-mj is defined as an unrestricted 
value of θ other than θmj.  By assumption (see above), pl increases with the amount and  13
duration of political competition in a municipality, whereas pc does not.  For notational 
simplicity political competition is proxied by e, the number of elections since the inception 
of local government in a municipality.  Hence 
) (e f pl = ,  0 >
de
dpl , and  0 =
de
dpc . 
Central government’s superior efficiency is modeled as a cost advantage in the provision of 
a given public good.  The head tax needed to finance a given level of provision under 
central government is thus αgj/nj with 0<α≤1, lower than local government’s tax gj/nj. 
In this Stackelberg game central government is the leader, and announces its level 
of provision first.  Local government observes this and calculates its optimal reaction, 
which it then provides.  The solution is via backwards induction, and so we begin with 
local government’s reaction.  For any gc that central government chooses, local 
government’s problem in district j is 
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where for convenience we drop subscripts j.  We take first order conditions and simplify the 
expression without loss of generality by letting θ-m  = 0.  Re-arranging provides local 
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As this is a full information game, central government can calculate local governments’ 
reactions as well as local governments can.  The center thus anticipates optimal local 
responses and incorporates them into its initial maximization.  Solving for district j, we take 
first order conditions and once more simplify by letting let θ-m = 0.  Re-arranging, we get 
central government’s optimal level of public good provision 
 






which is similar to (2), but also invokes central government’s superior efficiency.    14
Local government’s share of public good provision can be represented as a fraction 
of central government’s, gj
l = γgj
c (γ ≥ 0; local provision can exceed central provision).  
Substituting for g
l* in (2) and re-arranging yields 




γ  (5) 
which is an expression for the relative contributions of local and central governments to 
total public good provision, gl/gc.  This equation shows that the relative contribution of 
local government falls with gc, but rises with: 
•  population n, because public goods can be provided more cheaply when the tax base 
is larger, 
•  probability pl that local government senses local preferences correctly, and 
•  median preference for the public good θm, implying that local government spends 
more on public goods that locals want more. 
In short, local governments will provide a larger share of those public goods that local 
citizens prefer more, which preferences it assesses better.  The presence of budget 
constraints means that local governments effectively concentrate their resources in these 
most-preferred goods and services, leaving less-preferred areas to mostly central provision.  
The model’s assumption that pl increases with the number of election cycles further implies 
that local government’s share of locally-preferred goods will increase over time.  This is 
consistent with the stylized facts presented above on enrollment and health coverage, and is 
the logical outcome of combining increasing information with stable local preferences.  In 
terms of the empirical results that follow, we can infer that citizens will most intensely use 
those public services in which the share of local provision is highest, as these are the 
services they prefer most, which preferences they have successfully conveyed to local 
governments. 
 
4.  Methodology 
 
We exploit an original database of municipal characteristics using data obtained from the 
Agustín Codazzi Geography Institute, National Administrative Department of Statistics, 
National Electoral Office, National Planning Department, and the Office of the Vice 
Presidency (summarized in the appendix).  The database covers over 95% of Colombian  15
municipalities for the period 1994-2004.
4  Within the Latin American context, Colombian 
municipal data are relatively abundant and detailed.
5  All information on budgets and 
financial flows is panel data.  All other data (e.g. demographic, infrastructural, institutional, 
social) is cross-sectional, from national censuses and other national surveys.  Our database 
retains data integrity by source.
6  We use similar variables from different sources in 
alternative specifications as robustness checks.  The models prove robust. 
We take advantage of the gradual nature of reform in Colombia to construct 
continuous variables that capture progressive reform, and use panel estimations to 
incorporate a large information set.  The availability of relatively high quality data further 
allows us to investigate decentralization’s effects on real policy outputs, and not just 
changes in resource inputs, as some other studies have done (e.g. Faguet 2004).  Section 3 
showed that decentralization in Colombia was associated with marked increases in public 
school enrollment and access of the poor to health care.  In order to investigate this 
relationship more rigorously, we estimate a model of access to education and health 
  ∆Amt = α + ζDmt + βRmt + δCmt + εmt (6) 
where ∆A is measured by the year-on-year change in student enrollment in state schools, 
and the change in the share of the poor covered by public health insurance; D is a vector of 
measures of where municipalities lie on the decentralization-centralization continuum; R is 
a vector of measures of resource availability (i.e. supply factors) that might independently 
affect student enrollment; and C is a vector of socioeconomic and geographic controls, all 
indexed by municipality m and year t. 
Our measures of decentralization, D, are based on municipal expenditures in 
education and health broken down by source of revenue.  They measure different levels of 
autonomy in municipal decision-making and resource commitment.  Because different 
sectors are financed in somewhat different ways, the variables we use in each cannot be 
identical.  The first variable for both sectors is own resources – revenue raised from local 
taxes and charges – as a share of total expenditure.  Such funds have no strings attached, 
and are at the free disposal of local governments to spend as they like. 
                                                 
4 Health data are available for the period 1997-2004. 
5 More data on a wider variety of local characteristics are collected in Colombia than any other 
country in the region bar Brazil. 
6 Meaning we do not combine information from different sources into a single variable.  16
The second D variable in education is municipal independence transfers – the 
product of a dummy variable that records which municipalities are “certified”, multiplied 
by the resource transfers that certification triggers to each municipality.  Certified 
municipalities receive transfers directly from central government, and not via departmental 
(akin to state or provincial) governments.  Although most of these funds are destined for 
teachers’ salaries, departments have discretion in how they disburse them to municipalities.  
Because certified municipalities avoid this intermediation, they are less subject to the 
interventions of higher levels of government.  By interacting the certification dummy with 
resource flows, we generate an indicator that should be able to distinguish relatively small 
differences in municipal discretion and independence.  Local governments that score higher 
in these two variables are substantively more decentralized than the rest.  The second D 
variable in health is a dummy variable recording when municipalities have been certified 
independent. 
The remaining variables record the share of total expenditure accounted for by 
central transfers allocated according to criteria that vary by sector.  For education, central 
transfers were linked to poverty indices from 1994-2001.
7  In 2001, Law 715 changed the 
allocation criterion to the number of state school students.  This was meant to tie central 
transfers more closely to school performance, and hence educational outcomes.  Hence the 
third and fourth D variables in education.  In health, the third D variable is transfers to 
independent municipalities as a proportion of those municipalities’ total expenditures.  The 
fourth variable is central transfers that finance local payrolls as explained above.  These are 
channelled through departments, and thus indicate higher levels of external intervention in 
local policy-making. 
The fifth D variable in health is the share of funds from FOSYGA (Solidarity 
Fund)
8 in total health expenditures.  FOSYGA is the central government’s main channel for 
financing and monitoring the subsidized public health system at the local level.   
Municipalities with higher values in these indicators face stronger incentives set by the 
center, and are thus much more “centralized”.  The coefficients of these D variables, ζ1... 
ζ4/5, are our main interest in these regressions.  If decentralization drives increases in school 
enrollment, then we expect ζ1 and ζ2 to be positive and larger in magnitude than ζ3 and ζ4; 
                                                 
7 The proportion of the local population above a predetermined level of unsatisfied basic needs.  17
if it increases access to health, we expect ζ1, ζ2, and ζ3  to be positive and larger in 
magnitude than ζ4 and ζ5. 
Other factors which might affect student enrollment and health access 
independently of decentralization include how richly a municipality funds its schools and 
hospitals, and the quality of municipal human resources.  We control for such effects with 
R, which includes a term for municipalities’ general expenditure growth, a term for the 
lagged student-teacher ratio, a term for per capita expenditure on public education or 
health, and a term for the share of total municipal personnel who are university graduates, 
as a measure of local government’s institutional capacity.  By controlling for 
municipalities’ overall level of expenditure in education and health, we ensure that the D 
terms capture the effect of decentralized authority over policy and resources, and not how 
richly those services are funded. 
Lastly, the variables in C control for municipal size, wealth, and unemployment.  
We also include measures of a municipality’s displaced population, separated between 
those that receive migratory flows and those that expel them, as rough proxies for how 
much a locality has been impacted by Colombia’s armed conflict.  Three final terms, the 
gross enrollment rate, the proportion of the school-age population attending private 
education, and lagged health insurance coverage amongst the poor capture level effects and 
complementarities between public and private enrollment. 
We estimate using random effects but with year and departmental dummies.  We 
prefer this to the usual fixed effects model for three reasons.  First, our LHS variable (∆A) 
is the percentage change in school enrollments and health coverage.  While there are good 
reasons why levels of either variable might vary systematically by municipality, implying 
fixed effects, this is not true of the first difference.  Hence there is no intuitive case for 
fixed effects.  Second, a Hausman test shows that random effects estimates are consistent.
 9  
And third, we explicitly control for those fixed effects that our knowledge of the 
Colombian context leads us to think are a relevant source of variation: departmental and 
year fixed effects.  We see no benefit from controlling further for individual municipal 
fixed effects, only a significant efficiency loss. 
                                                                                                                                                     
8 Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía (literally the Solidarity and Guaranty Fund)  18
The specification in (6) is based on the theory that a given level of expenditure will 
produce improved outputs when allocated and executed locally rather than centrally.  In this 
case, outputs are measured as student enrollment rates and access of the poor to subsidized 
health care, and inputs are measured as locally-controlled resources.  But there is the 
possibility of the opposite relationship, and hence endogeneity, if instead independently 
increasing enrollment rates are causing municipalities to spend more of their own resources 
on education and health.  Hence we also estimate equation (6) instrumenting for D1 with the 
log of two year lagged local tax revenues per capita. 
 
The economic logic for this instrument is two-fold.  One the one hand, higher local 
tax revenues imply greater resources that can be freely allocated through a budgeting 
process for health and education.  In other words, the channel through which tax revenues 
affect education and health outcomes is decisions made in the local budgeting process.  On 
the other hand, reverse causality cannot apply.  There is no sense in which changes in 
school enrollments today should affect levels of per capita local taxes yesterday. 
Accordingly, two year lagged per capita taxes should have a high correlation with Own 
Resources/Total Education or Health Expenditures, but no correlation with increases in 
student enrollment or health access.  Pairwise correlations of the variables bear this out, 
with a ten-fold difference in magnitude.  We use 2SLS panel estimations.
10  A Sargan test 
confirms that two year lagged per-capita taxes is a suitable instrument for the share of own 
resources in total education and health spending.
11  Both sets of results are presented below. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
9 The Hausman test null hypotheses that “difference in coefficients – fixed versus random effects – 
are not systematic” is accepted for both sectors. For education chi2(1) = 0.02 with Prob>chi2 = 
0.8997; for health chi2(1) = 0.21 with Prob>chi2 = 0.6449. 
10 Note that LHS data is not censored/truncated.  Observed “zeros” are real zeros, and not failures of 
measurement or excluded negative values.  Hence a 2SLS panel estimation is appropriate.  As a 
check, we also estimated the IV model with a Tobit first stage.  The findings did not change. 
11 The second instrument used in the education equation is the land Gini coefficient, under the 
neoinstitutionalist assumption that the concentration of economic power leads to less investment in 
public goods (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000). In the case of health, the 
second instrument used is FARC guerrilla activity, under the assumption that a municipality 
confronted with illegal armed groups must divert resources from social to other types of spending, 
such as security, infrastructure reconstruction, etc. (Sanchez et al, 2007). Both instruments have the 
expected sign.  19
5.  Evidence 
 
Figures 6 and 7 provide results from our estimation of equation (6) for education and 
health.  Both panel (OLS) and IV estimations are listed, instrumenting for own resources 
with the level of lagged per capita taxes in both sectors.  The “IV 2” estimation, in which a 
second instrument is added, provides a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which 
confirms that instruments and residuals are uncorrelated, and hence two year lagged local 
taxes are associated with exogenous variation in own resources.  We also estimate the 
model for both sectors on a subset of municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, in 
order to focus on smaller, overwhelmingly rural localities. 
5.1  Education 
The first two measures of decentralization are positive and significant at the 1% level 
throughout.  This provides strong evidence that public school enrollment rises as the share 
of own resources in total education expenditure rises, and when municipalities are more 
independent of the center.  IV estimates of both coefficients are similarly significant but 
larger in size – own resources doubles – implying that OLS estimates are biased 
downwards.  The magnitude of the effect estimated is relatively large.  The coefficient 
implies that, ceteris paribus, a typical municipality that increases its share of education 
spending by one standard deviation will raise the growth rate of enrollment by almost its 
full mean value (equivalent to a 0.21 standard deviation increase; see data summary 
appendix). 
The first negative measure of decentralization produces coefficients equal to zero 
throughout, while the fourth variable is positive and significant at the 1% level, but smaller 
than own resources throughout.  The difference between these coefficients becomes quite 
large in the IV models: the coefficient on own resources is twice that of statutory transfers 
in IV 1, and grows to three times as large for the sample of small municipalities.  This 
implies that where central transfers form a large part of total expenditures, and hence 
municipalities face strong incentives set by the center, public enrollment increases, but at a 
significantly slower rate than where own resources dominate.  We interpret these results as 
evidence that decentralization of education has led to improved educational outcomes in 
Colombia, in the sense of more students attending school.  By contrast, outcomes have 
improved much more slowly in those places where central control persists.  20
Dependent Variable: Increase in Public School Enrollment
Independent Variable
OLS IV 1 IV 2 ++
IV          




0.1461*** 0.2954*** 0.3134*** 0.3187***
Total education expenditures [0.0156] [0.800] [0.0805] [0.1122]
0.0542*** 0.0688*** 0.0693***
[0.0103] [0.012] [0.0127]
Statutory transfers (poverty)/ -0.0225 0.0097 0.0081 -0.0336
Total education expenditures [0.0185] [0.0252] [0.0254] [0.0339]
0.1241*** 0.1462*** 0.1262*** 0.1119***
Total education expenditures [0.0289] [0.0312] [0.0322] [0.0410]
Resource Availability Variables
0.2076*** 0.2045*** 0.2058*** 0.2037***
[0.0065] [0.0067] [0.0068] [0.0097]
-0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0015***
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
-0.1615*** -0.1683*** -0.1686*** -0.1836***
public education (ln) [0.0048] [0.0060] [0.0059] [0.0071]
0.0253** 0.0202* 0.0197* -0.0009
municipal personnel [0.0104] [0.0108] [0.0108] [0.0140]
Socioeconomic and Geographic Control Variables
Population (ln) -0.0214*** -0.0212*** -0.0214*** -0.0433***
[0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0033]
Poverty rate 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0004***
[0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00008]
-0.0414*** -0.0379*** -0.0408*** -0.0437**
[0.0137] [0.0138] [0.0139] [0.0195]
Displaced population, receiving -0.0893 -0.0789 -0.0759 0.0479
municipalities [0.1240] [0.1243] [0.1243] [0.1488]
-0.1808*** -0.1767*** -0.1742*** -0.2146***
municipalities [0.0455] [0.0457] [0.0457] [0.0550]
-0.0490*** -0.0498*** -0.0507*** -0.0598***
(lagged)(% of school-age population) [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0040]
0.3908*** 0.3505*** 0.3460*** 0.2388***
pop. in private school)(ln., lagged) [0.0460] [0.050] [0.0508] [0.0663]
Constant 2.4533*** 2.5526*** 2.5571*** 2.9698***
[0.0730 ] [0.0838] [0.0825] [0.1049]
Municipal expenditure growth
Per capita expenditure on
Student - teacher ratio (lagged)
Private enrollment rate (% of school-age
Unemployment rate (departmental)
Public school gross enrollment rate
University graduates as a share of
Displaced population, expelling
Instrumenting for Own Resources
Own resources/
Statutory transfers (no. of students)/
Municipal independence transfers +
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Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Department fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 10553 10553 10481 6756
Groups 1081 1081 1073 693
Instruments
Per capita local taxes (t-1) 0.0146*** 0.0148*** 0.0126***
[0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0008]    
Gini of land value -0.0098*
[0.0053]
Endogeneity test  3.64 4.25 3.68
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.056 0.039 0.055
Sargan statistic 0.97
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.32
F-test for instruments 419.8 211.1 233.6
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses
*,**,*** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
+ No municipalities below 50,000 inhabitants have been certified "independent" yet.
++ Second instrument added to test for instrument exogeneity.  
Figure 6: Decentralization’s Effect on Public School Enrollments 
 
Supply-side measures of resources availability are mostly significant at the 1% 
level.  They show that enrollment increases as expenditure grows, and falls as the (lagged) 
student-teacher ratio rises, as one would expect.  Curiously, the per capita expenditure term 
is also negative.  This offers additional evidence that raising student numbers is not a 
simple question of increasing the size of the education budget, but rather depends on other 
factors related to the quality of spending, and allied decision-making about education 
policy.  IV estimates of these coefficients are of very similar size, and retain their high 
significance.  There is some evidence that enrollment rises with the quality of local 
government’s human resources, although both the size and significance of these estimates 
fall in the IV models.   
Amongst socioeconomic and geographic controls, results of interest include the first 
three coefficients, implying that districts that are smaller, poorer, and suffer less 
unemployment saw greater increases in enrollment.  These results have a high level of 
significance and increase in magnitude for smaller municipalities.  Other control variables 
capturing the impact of forced migration due to Colombia’s armed violence, and enrollment 
level effects are also significant and unsurprising.  Perhaps most interesting of this last 
group of results is that public enrollment rises with the share of students attending private  22
schools, indicating complementarity between the public and private education systems.   
This contradicts the impression of substitution between public and private enrollment 
implied in figure 4.  Decentralization appears not to improve public schooling at the 
expense of private schools, but rather to promote the idea of education more generally. 
 
5.2  Health 
Our first two indicators of decentralization are positive and highly significant for 
health, but much larger in size than education, implying that municipal autonomy has an 
even larger effect in the health sector.  Both coefficients increase in the IV models, 
dramatically so in the case of own resources, which increases further still for the sample of 
small municipalities.  The magnitude of the effect is much larger than education.  The IV 1 
coefficient implies that, ceteris paribus, a typical municipality that increases its share of 
health expenditure by one standard deviation will increase health insurance coverage by 1.5 
times its average value for all Colombian municipalities (equivalent to 0.72 standard 
deviations).  In this sense, the effect of financial local effort is significant. 
Paradoxically the third decentralization term, transfers to independent 
municipalities, is negative and significant at the 1% level.  This is doubly odd: not only are 
the first two terms positive, implying the opposite relationship, but the second of these 
measures a very similar concept – certification of municipal independence.  These results 
call into question the underlying concept of municipal “independence”, which certification 
is made by central government, and the main implication of which is a change in the 
disbursement mechanism for central resources.  Henceforth we de-emphasize “municipal 
independence”, relying instead on our principal measure of decentralization – own 
resources/total expenditures. 
Statutory central transfers for salaries, a negative indicator of decentralization, is 
essentially equal to zero for the full sample.  It becomes positive and significant for the 
small municipalities subsample, though of much smaller size than own resources.   
FOSYGA – the central government’s most important means for funding and monitoring the 
local health system – is likewise insignificant for the full sample, and significant only at the 
10% level for the subsample, implying that central government’s main health policy has 
little or no effect on municipal outcomes.  23
Overall these results are very similar to those for education.  By far the largest effect 
is from our most important measure of decentralization.  It implies that as municipalities 
fund health more from resources over which they have free disposal, health coverage of the 
poor increases strongly.  Being certified “independent” by the center has an ambiguous 
effect, which calls into question the proper interpretation of “independence” (for both 
sectors).  Central transfers for payrolls and via the center’s main health program have 
essentially no effect across all municipalities.  The former does increase health access in the 
smallest municipalities, but with much smaller impact than own resources. 
Amongst measures of resource availability, only municipal expenditure growth is 
significant (1%) and positive, as one would expect.  This effect is replicated throughout.  
Per capita expenditures in health are essentially insignificant, implying again, although 
weakly, that increasing health coverage is not simply a matter of increasing funding.  The 
quality of local government’s human resources appears to have no effect.  24
Dependent Variable: Increase in Health Insurance Amongst the Poor
Independent Variable
OLS IV 1 IV 2 ++
IV         




0.7127*** 3.8580*** 3.7354*** 5.3235***




Total health expenditures [0.1058] [0.1482] [0.1416]
Statutory transfers/ 0.0524* 0.0477 0.0479 0.3004***
Total health expenditures [0.0280] [0.0333] [0.0329] [0.0682]
0.0048 0.0007 0.0009 0.1074**
[0.0278] [0.0330] [0.0327] [0.0543]
Resource Availability Variables
0.0555*** 0.0434*** 0.0439*** 0.0697***
[0.0097] [0.0123] [0.0120] [0.0174]
0.0098* 0.0055 0.0057 0.0211*
public health (ln) [0.0059] [0.0072] [0.0070] [0.0120]
-0.0067 -0.0352 -0.0341 -0.0122
municipal personnel [0.0201] [0.0259] [0.0251] [0.0396]
Socioeconomic and Geographic Control Variables
Population (ln) 0.0307*** 0.0369*** 0.0366*** 0.0671***
[0.0024] [0.0036] [0.0034] [0.0105]
Poverty rate 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** -0.00005
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002]
-0.0641** -0.0239 -0.0255 0.036571
[0.0268] [0.0349 ] [0.0338] [0.0622]
Displaced population, receiving -0.1649 -0.152 -0.1524 -0.0326
municipalities [0.1881] [0.2232] [0.2207] [0.3244]
-0.0838 -0.0534 -0.0546 -0.0696
municipalities [0.0698] [0.0836] [0.0824] [0.1221]
-0.0339*** -0.0296*** -0.0298*** -0.0534***
the poor [0.0061] [0.0074] [0.0073] [0.0136]
Constant -0.3854*** -0.3701*** -0.3668*** -0.9656***
[0.0801] [0.0983] [0.0961] [0.1959]
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Department fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 6265 6260 6260 3969
Groups 1068 1068 1068 693
Instrumenting for Own Resources
Own resources/
Transfers to independent municipalities/
Unemployment rate (departmental)
Municipal expenditure growth
Municipal independence dummy +
Fosyga / Total health expanditure
Health insurance coverage amongst
Displaced population, expelling
Per capita expenditure on
University graduates as a share of
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Instruments
Per capita local taxes (t-2) 0.0880*** 0.0868*** 0.0973***
[0.0170] [0.0170] [0.0244]
Rate of attacks by the FARC -0.0909***
[0.0319]
Endogeneity test  11.184 13.501 23.483
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.0008 0.0002 0.0000
Sargan statistic 0.052
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.8194
F-test for instruments 26.53 17.34 15.87
Prob > F       0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Panel regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses
*,**,*** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
+ No municipalities below 50,000 inhabitants have been certified "independent" yet.
++ Second instrument added to test for instrument exogeneity.  
Figure 7: Decentralization’s Effect on Access of the Poor to Health Care 
 
The most interesting of the socioeconomic and geographic controls reflects a 
finding for education: health coverage rises with the poverty rate, implying higher coverage 
growth in poorer municipalities; oddly, this effect disappears in the subsample.  Unlike 
education, coverage is higher in larger municipalities, perhaps reflecting indirectly the 
economies of scale available in health care.  Of the remaining control variables only level 
effects of insurance coverage are clearly significant, and unsurprising.  There is some 
evidence that access worsens with the unemployment rate, as one might expect.  All other 
terms are insignificant. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
The evidence implies that one of the most powerful and frequently cited arguments 
in the literature– that decentralization can improve the quality of public services, and hence 
the flow of benefits to citizens – held true for the case of Colombia.  In districts where 
educational finance and policy making were most under the control of local authorities and 
most free of central influence, enrollment increased strongly.  In districts where educational 
finance was still based on centrally-controlled criteria, enrollment increases were between 
one-half and two-thirds smaller.  These results control for the level of expenditure.   
Decentralization thus improved enrollment rates in public schools.  It is striking that these 
changes were even more marked in poorer, smaller municipalities.  26
The evidence is similar for health.  Where services were financed more out of local 
revenues over which local authorities have free disposal, health coverage of the poor 
increased strongly.  Indeed, coverage in the Andean region approached 90% by 2004, a 
result that some far richer countries might justifiably envy.  In districts where health was 
financed more out of the central government’s health program, by contrast, access to health 
rose only 1/17
th as much.  These municipalities missed out on the vast majority of the gains 
that more decentralized municipalities enjoyed.  As for education, coverage rose more 
strongly amongst poorer municipalities.  For both sectors, our results are robust to 
alternative specifications. 
It is notable that for both sectors, increasing access is not a simple question of 
providing more resources.  The coefficient on per capita expenditures is negative for 
education and essentially zero for health.  Throwing money at the problem of access does 
not solve it.  It is, rather, how the money is spent and by whom that seems to matter – the 
quality, and not quantity, of public expenditure.  Our theoretical results shed additional 
light on this question.  The typical dynamic in a decentralized system is that central 
government announces nationwide policies and programs, and the budget allocations these 
entail.  Local government observes these and then chooses how to allocate its own 
resources locally.  Our model implies that elected local governments that are better 
informed about local needs and preferences will concentrate their resources in the areas 
their voters care about most. 
The combination of empirical and theoretical results implies that decentralization is 
generating accountability in local government throughout much of Colombia.  Political 
competition and local democracy provide local officials with the information and incentives 
they need to allocate their own resources in a manner responsive to voters’ needs, and 
improve the quality of expenditure so as to maximize its impact.  It is not surprising that the 
end result of this process is greater usage of local services by local citizens, who thus 
receive a greater flow of benefits from public expenditure.  These findings contradict 
common claims that local government is too corrupt, institutionally weak, or prone to 
interest-group capture to improve upon central government’s allocation of public resources.  27
 
Appendix – Data Summary 
Variable* Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Education (1994-2004)
Increase in student enrollment in public schools 10553 0.0238 0.1091 -0.5214 1.5224
Own resources / Total education expenditures 10559 0.0406 0.0731 0 0.9938
Municipal independence 10559 0.0117 0.1045 0 1
Statutory transfers (poverty) / Total education 10559 0.1744 0.1344 0 0.6580
   expenditures
Statutory transfers (no. of students) / Total 10559 0.0351 0.0732 0 0.9960
   education expenditures
Municipal expenditure growth 10559 0.0537 0.1688 -0.7263 1.8967
Per capita expenditure on public education (ln) 10559 13.7073 0.3643 11.8198 15.5100
Student/Teacher ratio (lagged) 10559 22.3558 9.1899 0 446.0
University graduates as a share of municipal 10559 0.0696 0.1008 0 0.8937
   personnel
Population (ln) 10559 9.6355 1.0456 6.3297 15.7657
Unsatisfied basic needs 10559 45.3104 22.2733 1.1293 105.2663
Displaced population, receiving municipalities 10559 0.0014 0.0087 0 0.3503
Displaced population, expelling municipalities 10559 0.0056 0.0245 0 0.7788
Unemployment rate (departmental) 10559 0.1270 0.0849 0.03 0.9990
Public-school gross enrollment rate (lagged) 10559 0.9720 0.3906 0.1 2.5000
   (% of school-age population)
Private enrollment rate (% school-age pop. 10559 0.0133 0.0266 0 0.4532
   in private schools)(ln, lagged)
Per capita local taxes (ln) 10559 -4.4642 1.2134 -9.3527 -0.5045
Health (1997-2004)
Increase in health insurance amongst the poor 6266 0.0829 0.1732 -0.4976 2.4013
Own resources / Total health expenditures 6267 0.0090 0.0321 0 0.8778
Municipal independence 6267 0.0206 0.1420 0 1
Statutory transfers / Total health expenditures 6267 0.2718 0.0875 0 0.7368
Transfers to independent municipalities / Total 6267 0.0047 0.0375 0 0.5530
   health expenditures
Fosyga / Total health expanditure 6267 0.1443 0.0818 0 0.5529
Municipal expenditure growth 6267 0.0308 0.2179 -0.6820 3.1490
Per capita expenditure on public health (ln) 6267 11.9546 0.5395 8.9660 14.5126
University graduates as a share of municipal 6267 0.0695 0.1010 0 0.8937
   personnel
Population (ln) 6266 9.6477 1.0588 6.3297 15.7657
Unsatisfied basic needs 6267 42.8152 22.6682 1.1293 104.2634
Displaced population, receiving municipalities 6267 0.0023 0.0112 0 0.3503
Displaced population, expelling municipalities 6267 0.0090 0.0313 0 0.7788
Unemployment rate (departmental) 6267 0.1417 0.0795 0.050 0.9990
% coverage of public health insurance 6267 0.5915 0.4981 0.025 6.8081
Per capita local taxes (ln) 6262 0.0071 0.0239 0.000 0.5450
* Municipal-level expenditure data for education are available from 1994, but only from 1997 for 
health.  Hence we separate data summaries by sector and time periods.   28
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